Woman as Peacemaker or the Ambivalent Politics of Myth by Selzner, Cyril
 
Miranda
Revue pluridisciplinaire du monde anglophone /












Université Toulouse - Jean Jaurès
 
Electronic reference
Cyril Selzner, “Woman as Peacemaker or the Ambivalent Politics of Myth”, Miranda [Online], 2 | 2010,
Online since 03 July 2010, connection on 16 February 2021. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/
miranda/1258 ; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/miranda.1258 
This text was automatically generated on 16 February 2021.
Miranda is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0
International License.
Woman as Peacemaker or the
Ambivalent Politics of Myth
Cyril Selzner
1 Every 8 March, on the occasion of international Women’s day, an ancient and by now
world-famous classical comedy by the Greek playwright Aristophanes is given new life
in  many languages  and contexts.  Lysistrata tells  the  story  of  Athenian and Spartan
women going on a collective and coordinated sex-strike to stop the bloody war between
their two cities—an actual war still raging in 411 BC when Aristophanes was writing.
Their action is surprisingly successful and their respective husbands have to agree to
give  up  their  war  games  when  they  face  the  threat  of  lasting  sexual  frustration,
apparently a very effective deterrent. Lysistrata is of course a work of fiction, but we do
have contemporary examples of such sex strikes with political motives, most recently
in Kenya and in Colombia,1 and they are more often than not inspired at least in part by
this very play. Aristophanes’ work is popular with both sexes today, not only due to its
free language (at least in the new translations now available), the farcical side of its
characters  coming  on  stage  in  a  visibly  excited  state  (the  actors  did  carry  leather
penises), and its variation on the “make love not war” slogan,2 but also because it uses,
exemplifies and reinforces one of the oldest stereotypes—in this case we would suggest
the  use  of  the  word  myth—about  women,  namely,  woman  as  a  peacemaker  and  a
resolver of conflicts, especially between men.3
2 That there is indeed a special connection between women and peace is presupposed at
least partly in a number of international and local interventions by groups of women in
politics. In recent times, many long-lasting conflicts have spurred political movements,
whether feminist or non-feminist in their inspiration and agenda, to make explicit use
of  the  fact  that  their  participants  are  women  and,  above  all,  mothers  and  wives,
implying that peace and peacemaking were—morally and politically speaking—a sphere
where women’s voices should legitimately be heard as much as,  and arguably more
than, any other group of people involved. Such movements often primarily argue their
position  by  recalling  the  fact  that  women  (and  children)  now  represent  a  large
proportion of direct or indirect casualties in any conflict, while gender bias in political
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and military  power  does  not  ensure  adequate  representation  of  their  interests.  No
victimization without representation sounds reasonable enough. Usually, though, they
tend to add another dimension to their line of argumentation: the inclusion of women
as such could foster the cause of peace, tip the balance in favor of conflict resolution
and ensure  that  resuming hostilities  would  appear  less  likely  in  the  future.  In  the
background frequently lurks the uncritical acceptance of the thesis of a greater male
impulse  to  aggression,  previously  used  to  justify  the  exclusion  of  women  from
competitive  and  conflictual  arenas  such  as  the  battlefield,  the  forum  and  the
marketplace, as Anne Fausto-Sterling reminds us:
Earlier  in  this  century  feminists  gave  [this]  theme—that  of  male  bellicosity—a
reverse twist. If women got the vote, some suffragists believed, there would be an
end  to  war.  When  women  entered  politics  their  natural  peaceableness  would
prevail, and men, unable without women’s help to control their primal destructive
urges, would finally join the ranks of the civilized.4
3 Irenic influence, interest in peace and ability in maintaining relationships seems then
to be attributed to  women in part  on the basis  of  their  status,  experience or  even
nature  as  women,  and  not  only  because  of  their  contingent  position  as  politically
powerless victims of male strife.
4 United  Nations  Resolution  1325  on  Women  Peace  and  Security  (October 2000),  for
instance, sometimes bears the clear imprint of this line of interpretation. Adopted in
the wake of the Fourth World Conference on Women (Beijing, 1995), it reaffirms “the
important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peace-
building” and accordingly:
[the resolution] urges Member States to ensure increased representation of women
at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and
mechanisms for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts.5
5 Studies are called for to study not only the impact of armed conflict on women and
girls, but also “the role of women in peace-building and the gender dimensions of peace
processes and conflict resolution”. UNSC 1325 promotes the voice of grass-root women
groups in peace matters, and women’s perspective in general, as part of its endeavor to
implement equal consideration of women, but clearly more is a stake here. An official
commentary on the resolution states that one of the main reasons why it was adopted
was  that  “women  have  often  demonstrated  their  ability  to  set  up  networks  that
transcend the dividing lines of conflict”.6 Official UN documentation usually avoids—
with good reason—controversial justifications and explicit metaphysical foundations,
but we could suspect that more than naked fact is appealed to here.
6 Indeed the scope of the myth seems to go well beyond the borders of humankind. The
Dutch  primatologist  Frans  de  Waal,  while  studying  peacemaking  among  primates,
records  an  event  having  occurred  at  Arnhem  Zoo  which  he  made  much  of:  a
chimpanzee  version  of  Lysistrata,  in  a  sense.  Male  chimps  usually  display  their
aggressiveness by grasping stones and using them as weapons, but not before having
staged an impressive show of anger (they stomp and strike the ground with their fists
with threatening gestures and battle cries). The group of females usually either stays
quiet or prepares to take sides in the upcoming battle. But not that time. A dominant
female chimp approached the would-be warrior, made a few gestures of appeasement
and indeed seduction (sexual invitations), and gently removed the stones from the male
hand to throw them away, thus preventing a potentially deadly fight.7 That looks like a
fact. Why call it a myth? What has it to do with myth? First, we should note that Frans
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de Waal is well known for his remorseless recourse to human analogies and vocabulary
in describing chimp life (especially in his fascinating book and international bestseller
Chimpanzee Politics).  He has been relentlessly attacked for it.  Second, it was a rather
isolated event: why did it attract de Waal’s attention so much if it did not confirm some
deep-seated intuition or expectation within himself? Chimpanzee Politics develops the
theme of the “mediating female” and offers several accounts of how a female chimp
can manipulate her personal relations with male rivals—sometimes by seducing them—
to achieve reconciliation between former enemies.8 The myth is of course not in the
recorded facts, but in what we make of the facts, and the emphasis we are prone to
place on them. Primatology is an ideological minefield, mostly because it is perceived
by the general public as dealing with human nature in the guise of our closest cousins
in  the  evolutionary  tree.  Hence  no  interpretation  of  primate  behavior  can  be
completely neutral. Maybe that is the case here, as some critics have pointed out.9
7 By naming the recourse to the theme of a specifically female peacemaking ability a
myth, I do not mean to argue that it is on the whole an illusion, and I am not calling
Aristophanes nor de Waal deluded liars, although some critics might want to use such
terminology.  I  do  not  intend  to  infer  that  particular  women  can  never  act  as
peacemakers in particular contexts, nor (which is of course a stronger point) that their
specific position as women has nothing to do with their peacemaking actions, either in
the form of direct motivation or as a tactical element. What I mean to suggest by using
this term is that ultimately its appeal is much more than an empirical problem, and
more than just a question of truth or falsehood. We could say that what belongs to
myth goes far  beyond and also beneath that  level  of  questioning.  A myth could be
defined  as  a  story  or  narrative  using  events  and  characters  to  build  conceptual
structures and emotional categorizations that help us make sense of life both on the
individual and the collective levels. A myth structures our expectations, discourses and
actions but  it  achieves  this  function in a  transcendental  fashion.  It  is  beyond facts
because it is what helps us make sense of facts. The best way to deal with a myth is not
to start marshalling the facts and organizing a sober confrontation with reality, but
rather confront the myth with two questions. First the genealogical question: “Where
do  you  come  from,  from  what  historical  or  psychological  depths  within  ourselves,
where  does  your  magical  power  over  us  come  from?”  (we  could  roughly  call  it
Nietzsche’s question); or we could ask the pragmatic—and foucaldian—question: “What
are you or can you be used for?”.  I  will  offer  a  tentative account of  some possible
answers for that second question.
8 At first sight, we might be somewhat puzzled by the fact that the myth seems to be
opposed to a more famous and well-established mytheme or mythical element, namely,
that “woman is the seed of all conflict” and ultimately, of all disorder and evil. 10 The
Bible, the Iliad and countless world mythologies articulate such a view in great detail
and it has a rather obvious connection to patriarchy or at least to an andocentric world.
11 Greek culture contemporaneous with Aristophanes was, in particular, familiar with
violent and dangerous female figures, as Pauline Schmitt Pantel reminds us.12 But we
need  not  be  troubled  by  this  apparent  inconsistency:  Lévi-Strauss  and  Freud,  in
different ways, taught us long ago that mythical logic, like that of the unconscious, can
operate beyond the principle of contradiction on the surface. One myth does not flatly
contradict  the  other.  Their  juxtaposition  tells  us,  though,  that  there  is  a  strong
imaginary  connection  in  many  human  cultures  between  woman  and  conflict.
Psychoanalysis, of course, has produced a large body of works dedicated to illuminating
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the ambivalent views on the links between women and peace, particularly as it relates
to early mother-infant relationships and the construction of mother-figures, but in this
paper I want to focus rather on the social and political side of the myth, on its uses and
not its alleged origins in culture or the individual psyche.
9 In recent times, as we have already seen, the “woman as peacemaker” myth has been
used as a tactical weapon to back specific or less specific political actions and more
generally to legitimate the claim to a greater involvement of women as such in politics.
In many ways, it can be, and has been used as a countermyth in Albert Memmi’s sense.
Memmi elaborated the notion of countermyth in Le portrait du colonisé and in L’homme
dominé in  order to  account  for  the  creation  of  positive  resistance  myths  among
colonized people, destined to oppose the negative myths the colonizers tried to force
on them by subverting the negative judgment attached to them.13 Myths they were, but
for a time they were contextually and tactically useful in the ideological struggle. A
countermyth  enables  the  dominated  group to  reject  derogatory  typecasting  by  the
dominant and it empowers them with useful cultural weapons with which they can
fight  the  colonizer  at  the  symbolic  and  intellectual  levels.  Frequently,  elements  of
earlier negative myths appear in the countermyth, this time in a glorified fashion: they
have been transvalued and reinterpreted. As Memmi was well aware, a countermyth
can outlive its usefulness and become a full-blown myth, particularly when the struggle
for liberation is over.14 Its extreme structural dependence on the negative myth it was
meant to fight against is hardly a sign that full independence has been obtained, and it
can effectively hinder the necessary moves beyond the conceptual and psychological
traps of the colonial situation.
10 In this case, women in general and militant feminists in particular can tap into the
culturally  acknowledged  power  of  the  woman  as  peacemaker  myth—originally
elaborated in a patriarchal context—and use it as a countermyth to fight back at what
they perceive to be, at the conscious or the subconscious level, an excuse for patriarchy
and male domination. As a component of a feminist strategy, such a move is closely
connected to a general line of argumentation prominent in British and North-American
feminism at least in the 19th century: using the idea of alleged superior moral qualities
in women, granted by men in the private sphere of home and the family, to argue for
their  greater  inclusion  in  the  public  sphere  precisely  by  reason  of  these  specific
qualities that men do not possess, or not to the same degree.15
11 At this point, it is useful to examine in greater detail what the myth has to say in its
dramatic  form. In Lysistrata,  as  well  as  other related plays by Aristophanes such as
Assembly  of  women and  Women  at  the  Thesmophoria,  women  claim  that  their  special
interest and expertise in peace is based on the fact they are the first victims of war
because  war  cuts  into  the  flesh  of  relationships  by  which  they  tend  to  define
themselves. War affects them as wives, sisters, daughters and, above all, mothers. They
are the ones providing the “material” (men and boys) necessary for warfare. We must
remember  that  for  ancient  Greeks,  childbirth  could  be  assimilated  with  a  patriotic
battlefield where women suffered and shed blood for the good of the City as a whole:
giving  birth,  in  a  sense,  was  their  civic  soldier’s  work.  Therefore,  as  the  character
Lysistrata reminds us, they stand to lose much more than men do: honor does not pay
them back for the loss of their men’s lives and, contrary to men, they do not have a
chance to marry again when their husband is killed in action. Therefore, their being
excluded from the realm of political decisions and relegated to the private sphere of
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home  can  be  contested  on  the  very  basis  of  their  interest  in  vital  relationships.
Everyone stands to gain from women taking over the political business and managing it
wisely like a private Oikos (that much is the subject of Assembly of Women). The sexual
division of labor and the separation of private and public spheres are thus challenged
in  the  name  of  the  greater  good  by  women  claiming  that  men  have  in  any  case
mismanaged the Polis. This is probably the strongest feminist thread we can isolate in
Aristophanes and one which has quite often been brought to the fore by contemporary
productions of the play.16
12 Basic to the power of the myth of women as potential peacemakers is the implicit or
explicit view that they are natural maintainers of relationships, primary providers of
protection and nourishment, especially for weaker individuals within the family and,
paradigmatically, for children. The feminist philosopher Sara Ruddick, for instance, has
extensively argued in Maternal Thinking in favor of the political potential of mothering
and of what she calls “a feminist maternal peace politics” (Ruddick 1989, 245). Because
mothers “have always been the custodians of the promises of birth” (Ruddick 1989,
251), they can develop beyond the care for their own children a discipline of attentive
love,  an  attention  to  bodies  and  to  whatever  can  harm  them  that  is  in  direct
contradiction to war. Indeed, “women tend to know, in a way and to a degree that men
do not, both the history and the cost of human flesh” (Ruddick 1989, 186). Even though
some mothers may fail to see the connection between their maternal experience and
peace on a larger scale, it remains that peacemaking is woven into their day-to-day
practice.
Peacemakers create a communal suspicion of violence, a climate in which peace is
desired, a way of living in which it is possible to learn and to practice nonviolent
resistance and strategies  of  reconciliation.  This  description of  peacemaking is  a
description of mothering. (Ruddick 244)
13 Ruddick’s position brings us to recent debates in ethics about what has come to be
called the ethics of care, originating largely in the publication of Carol Gilligan’s 1982
work In a Different Voice, followed by Nel Noddings’ Caring in 1984, to mention but the
pioneering works in what has since become a vast  body of  scholarship.  What I  am
interested  in  is  not  so  much these  extremely  valuable  works  in  themselves  as  the
ambivalence of their reception in and beyond academic circles. The extent to which the
ethics of care represents an instance of feminine ethics as opposed to masculine views
previously parading as universal and generic ethics is controversial, but is central to
our  assessment  of  the  idea  of  a  specific  feminine  ability  in,  and  concern  with
peacemaking.
14 Gilligan  started  in  the  field  of  moral  psychology  by  criticizing  Jean  Piaget’s  and
Lawrence Kohlberg’s scale of moral development in children and teenagers because
while  their  experiments  tended to  show that  girls  lagged  behind  boys  in  terms  of
maturation,  they  were  oblivious  to  the  fact  that  their  methods  were  themselves
gender-biased  (or  so  Gilligan  claimed).  Whereas  boys  usually  come  to  understand
problems of  justice  in  terms of  a  calculation of  rights  and obligations,  on a  rather
abstract level, girls are handicapped by what seems to be an impairment but need not
be  seen  that  way.  They  simply  follow  a  different  line  of  development,  a  different
“voice” as Gilligan says, a voice whose overarching concern, in short, is maintaining
relationships and caring for vulnerable and significant others rather than adjudicating
abstract  rights  or  acknowledging general  rules  of  a  moral  game (Gilligan 1982,  98).
Gilligan proves her point by analyzing the different reactions of boys and girls to the
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story of Heinz introduced by Kohlberg. Heinz has to consider stealing a drug from a
pharmacist in order to save his wife. He has no means to buy it and the pharmacist
refuses to give it for free. What should Heinz do? Jake treats the dilemma as a conflict
of  rights and,  since the value of  life  clearly overrides the principle of  property,  he
concludes unproblematically that Heinz should steal the drug. Amy seems to be more
confused: she is uncomfortable with the theft and suggests considering other means,
such as engaging in further talk with the pharmacist.
Seeing a world comprised of relationships rather than of people standing alone, a
world  that  coheres  through human connection  rather  than through systems of
rules, she finds the puzzle of the dilemma to lie in the failure of the druggist to
respond to the wife. […] Thus she considers the solution to the dilemma to lie in
making  the  wife’s  condition  more  salient  to  the  druggist  or,  that  failing,  in
appealing to others who are in a position to help. (Gilligan 1982, 29)
15 Boys seem ready to resort to violence—even physical violence if the pharmacist should
try to resist the robbery—more easily because they live in a world where autonomy and
responsibility  in  the  sense  of  responding  to  abstract  obligations  are  the  dominant
ethical values. They can view themselves and others as detached atoms and therefore
feel  they  have  a  moral  right  to  fight  against  the  evil  druggist:  open  conflict  and
ultimately war can thus easily  appear justified and even become a legitimate duty.
Girls,  on  the  other  hand,  tend  to  view  responsibility  in  a  different  way,  as
“responsiveness  in  relationships” (Gilligan  1988,  4).  In  girls’  moral  reasoning,  “the
common thread […] is the wish not to hurt others and the hope that in morality lies a
way of solving conflicts so that no one will be hurt” (Gilligan 1982, 65). Gilligan’s studies
apparently  support  the  idea  that  peacemaking  abilities  can  be  connected  to  this
predominantly feminine voice because of its relationship-oriented style. Women and
girls  tend  to  value  mediation  much  more,  and  to  be  more  concerned  with  the
disrupting  consequences  of  open  conflict:  peace-building  is  in  this  perspective  an
aspect of relationship keeping, mending or restoring.17 Furthermore, because they have
a tendency to extend the perception of violence to many relation-breaking situations
(deliberate silence, mutual indifference, neglect), women seem to pay more attention to
the prevention of conflict than men do.
16 Gilligan is very careful even in her 1982 work not to imply that girls are intrinsically
different beings, almost a different species from boys, with totally diverging patterns of
moral reasoning. She does not explicitly state that girls are, because they are female,
sensitive  beings  gifted  with  a  form  of  empathy  that  boys  supposedly  lack,  being
endowed with reason rather than imagination.18 She clearly avoids at least some of the
pitfalls of essentialism, yet the fact remains that “Care focus dilemmas are more likely
to be presented by women and Justice focus dilemmas by men” (Gilligan 1988,  82).
Although “not gender specific, it [is] gender related” (Gilligan 1988, 8), pointing at least
to  a  persistent  gender-based  difference  in  moral  perspectives  in  our  societies.  Nel
Noddings’ development of similar ideas is initially less agnostic on that matter—some
would  say  less  cautious—in  claiming  that  the  ethics  of  care  represent  a  “feminine
approach  to  ethics”,  complementing  the  predominantly  masculine  approach  of
morality  in  terms  of  justice,  autonomy  and  rights.19 Many,  in  any  case,  have  read
Noddings and Gilligan as arguing in favor of expanding the classical and philosophical
view of morality by including women, whose specific voices had almost always been
repressed in a patriarchal society.
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17 The critics  of  the  ethics  of  care,  particularly  on the  feminist  side,  have sometimes
insisted on the point that it could turn out to be a new and ambivalent way to defend
an old-fashioned, indeed Victorian idea that women are, on the whole, morally superior
to men. Claiming that women are qualified on this basis to intervene in public matters
could  therefore  backfire  and  spell  regress,  not  progress  for  the  feminist  cause.  A
number  of  feminist  thinkers  have  pointed  out  long  ago  how  pedestals  can  work
ambivalently as effective means of exclusion, and that exalting a supposedly natural
female  quality  can  serve  as  justification  to  segregate  women and relegate  them to
menial or devalued tasks. In the classic, seminal work of John Stuart Mill, The Subjection
of Women, we find one of the early critiques of the moral idealization of woman as a
self-sacrificing, self-effacing saint always “at the beck and call of somebody, generally
of everybody” (Mill 1986, 77). According to Mill, this moral ideal is highly artificial and
should be considered, rather than a natural quality, a product of intense socialization
in a patriarchal world:
All  the  moralities  tell  them  that  it  is  the  duty  of  women,  and  all  the  current
sentimentalities  that  it  is  their  nature,  to  live for  others;  to  make  complete
abnegation of themselves, and to have no life but in their affections. (Mill 21)
18 Precisely because women are expected to behave more altruistically than men, they are
excluded from the competitive and “dirty” realms of politics, economics and science.
They are too pure and too moral to take an active part in public spheres that too often
necessitate  an  aggressive  stand,  or  can  force  “dirty-hands” dilemmas  on  men,  and
therefore they are carefully and wisely kept within the private sphere of the family
where their qualities are useful, and where they are sheltered from the corruption of
the world. And so it occurs that, according to Mill, “we are perpetually told that women
are better than men, by those who are totally opposed to treating them as if they were
as good” (Mill 47). Conscious and unconscious assignments of identity, we should now
know, are more efficient than direct restraint and oppressive rules. In this case, the
popular view that women will behave altruistically because it is what they are, sets a
dangerous yet easy trap. Claiming a room of one’s own becomes indeed difficult when it
means  relinquishing  the  desirable  virtues  associated  with  what  one  is  taught  to
consider one’s natural character.  Any woman who refused to incarnate and act out
what women are universally celebrated for would lose at the same time the basis of her
self-worth and her identity as a woman in such a cultural context.20
19 Many feminists have developed this line of critique by targeting the way the myth of
the altruistic, affectionate and caring woman upheld a separation of private and public
spheres that historically and effectively barred women from social and political power.
Susan Okin, in Justice, Gender and the Family, showed how the role women were assigned
within the family,  both in theory and in practice,  was the “linchpin of gender”,  by
which  she  meant  “the  deeply  entrenched  institutionalization  of  sexual  difference”
(Okin 1989, 6). Feminism, in her view, should be about the deconstruction, even the
destruction of gender.21 Her early work Women in Western Political Thought was dedicated
to analyzing how “it was the philosophers’ attitude toward the family, above all else,
which has determined their conclusions about the rights and the social role of women”
(Okin 1992, 237). If women have to remain the angel in the house, that is, homemakers
and pillars of the family,  which in turn represents for men a “haven in a heartless
world”,  then their  peace-building abilities  are  best  kept  within the  confines  of  the
private  sphere.  Sociologists  like  Ferdinand  Tönnies  and  Emile  Durkheim,  who
introduced  the  distinction  between  community  and  society,  Jacques  Commaille
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reminds us, have also deplored that women should enter society and its contractual
relationships, hence destroying the warm community of home which compensated for
the toughness of public life.22 We might also recall how the debates during the French
Revolution at times revolved around the idea that partaking in politics would destroy
the “moral empire” of women, thus becoming an effective means to exclude them from
political action in the guise of extolling their specific virtues (Fraisse 1995, 166sq). Okin
sternly concludes that “the capacity of reactionary forces to capitalize on the 'different
moralities' strain in feminism is particularly evident” (Okin 1989, 15).
20 As  far  as  the  ethics  of  care  are  concerned,  such  criticisms  prompted  attempts  to
dissociate its defense from the myth of the affectionate, naturally caring woman. Joan
Tronto,  trying  to  build  a  political  concept  of  care,  moved  away  from  its
sentimentalization,  its  naturalization and its  association with  gender,  in  favor  of  a
democratization and universalization of care.23 This meant in effect a critical view of
the ambivalence of  feminist  positions trying to argue women’s  inclusion in politics
from  the  standpoint  of  a  specifically  feminine  morality  based  on  a  supposed
peacemaking capacity.  Jean Bethke Elshtain,  more sympathetically,  has documented
the  way  suffragists  like  Elizabeth  Cady  Stanton,  heralding  a  “new  evangel  of
womanhood” used this strategy to overcome the opposition to political inclusion:
The Suffragists’ ultimate conclusions were that private morality could be applied to
the public level; that public persons ought to be judged by the rigorous standards of
the private sphere; that the public (im)moral qualities men exhibited were probably
innate to the male character,  but that men, too,  could be transformed as could
public life by the entry of women into it; that the qualities women exhibited were
innate and were not merely an outgrowth of their enforced domesticity; that these
same  qualities  were  the  qualities  that  would  invest  the  political  sphere  with  a
sanctified aura. (Elshtain 238)
21 Yet even Elshtain records the failure in overcoming the obstacles barring women from
politics by resorting to an argumentation that presupposed a strongly gendered public/
private  dichotomy.  “The  assumption  that  women  were  to  stay  pure  and  to  purify
politics at the same time” (Elshtain 239) could only trap these feminists into a double
bind and give fuel to their opponents. In France, some similar arguments supporting
the newly implemented parité (meaning equal numbers of women and men) at many
levels of political representation have been attacked even within the paritarist side for
precisely this reason, and supporters of parité have taken great care not to confuse
their cause with the idea of a superior and distinct feminine morality, as Joan Scott has
noted.24 One of the reasons is the perception of the ambivalence of such arguments, and
their relative failure in the long run, because, as Tronto states, “despite its longevity
and  its  great  appeal,  the  strategy  of  women’s  morality  cannot  be  counted  as  very
successful” (Tronto 1).
22 What I have attempted to argue is not that Mill is right and other feminists are wrong—
including  the  feminists  who  argued  for  parité in  French  politics  on  the  basis  that
women could contribute a different style or voice in debates on social justice, one less
exclusively  based  on  the  liberal  fiction  of  the  autonomous  individual  devoid  of
attachments  and vulnerability.25 That  would  suppose  that  public  discourse  can and
should be rid of all mythical elements, and could be made to consist of purely rational
processes  of  argumentation,  which,  I  would  suggest,  is  a  rather  utopian  view.
Furthermore, given the massive evidence that on a global level, women’s inclusion in
politics is far from achieved even in democratic states and that feminist arguments,
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though gaining ground, are still not accepted nor even understood by large segments of
population worldwide, even in developed countries, resorting to shared myth could be
an interesting strategy, at least to begin with.26 Politics is about change, even radical
change, but it could also be compared to sailing: it is an art of the possible in which we
control the sails, not the winds. If appealing to myths that can be heard and accepted
by everyone in a patriarchal society—such as “women are natural peacemakers”—can
promote women’s participation in politics, why should feminists allow their hands to
be tied and not make use of them? Whenever we use a myth in a political or ideological
context, though, either because we believe in it or for tactical reasons within a given
cultural context, we should acknowledge the fact that a myth, even a countermyth, is
always ambivalent, open to many interpretations and uses, including some we would
never want to condone.  Therefore,  I  would suggest,  our political  judgment of  them
should itself remain ambivalent.
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NOTES
1. In 2006 some women called for a sex strike, called la huelga de las piernas cruzadas (literally, the
strike of crossed thighs/legs) in order to stop gang violence in Colombia. In 2009, Kenyan women
at the call of the Women’s Development Organization vowed a week-long abstinence targeting
male politicians and decision-makers to prevent renewed civil strife. Rukia Subow, chairperson
of the WDO, declared that the strike would bring peace through men’s pressure on government,
and that they were ready to pay prostitutes not to work during that week.
2. In that case, as is often said about Lysistrata, the interesting variation would be: “do not make
love in order to stop war”.
3. We should note that the peacemaking woman is only one among many other gender
stereotypes the play makes use of. Another one of them would be that sex is essentially a service
delivered by women in favor to insatiable men in return for food and protection: a male sex
strike would make less sense in that respect.
4. Fausto-Sterling 1992,  124.  Anne Fausto-Sterling gives a very critical  review of the popular
theory of male “hormonal aggressiveness” and of its scientific credentials in her study (see esp.
chapter 5).
5. The text of the resolution is available online.
6. See the Message of the inter-agency task force on Women, Peace and Security. 
7. See De Waal 1996, 39. De Waal declares that he was able to observe such behavior of female
mediation “several times”.
8. See De Waal  1982,  chapter 2.  De Waal  notes that female chimps as a  group have a direct
interest in maintaining peace among males, especially dominant ones, since it critically affects
their security.
9. For a critical point of view on that topic and de Waal’s answer, see De Waal 2006, Annex A. 
10. Even enlightened philosophers like Spinoza or Kant were not immune from the power of the
myth of the dangerosity of women. Spinoza famously claimed that achieving gender equality
would bring war, not peace. See Sonia Dayan-Herzbrun, “La mixité dans le politique” in Ballmer-
Cao et al. 2000.
11. Nel Noddings, among many other feminist thinkers, has finely dealt with that side of the
myth in her work Women and Evil (see Noddings 1989, esp. chapter 2). 
12. See Pauline Schmitt Pantel. “De la construction de la violence en Grèce ancienne : femmes
meutrières et hommes séducteurs”,  in Dauphin et al.  1997.  She emphasizes,  though, that the
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representation of male violence towards women far exceeds the number of violent female figures
in mythology, literature and iconography. We could add that no one has ever claimed that Greek
civilization  was  particularly  woman-friendly,  as  it  was  clear  even  in  antiquity–Plutarch,  for
example, sharply contrasted Greek and Roman civilizations in that respect.
13. The first occurrence of the ideas of “contre-mythologie ”and “mythe positif” can be found in
Memmi 1957, 180.
14. See Memmi’s comments on Malcolm X and his theories in L’homme dominé:  “S’il  s’agit  de
mythes, ce sont plutôt des contre-mythes, des réponses délirantes aux délires de l’accusation”
(Memmi 1973, 20).
15. Hence the frequent association of early British and North American feminisms with political
issues bearing strong moralizing overtones, such as slavery and the fight against alcoholism. This
is  obviously  true  of  nineteenth-century  feminism,  but  this  distinctly  moralizing  style  is
perceptible even today when compared, say, with the mainstream of French feminism.
16. In order to get an immediate objection out of the way, it would be necessary to recall that
Aristophanes himself could hardly be labeled a feminist in any case. He was addressing an all-
male audience and Lysistrata is first of all a comedy toying with carnivalesque ideas of inversion of
the  traditional  and  “proper” order  of  things  (male  monopoly  on  political  power,  to  which
Aristophanes  of  course  subscribed).  Such  comic  inversions  were  common  considering  the
original bacchic context in which these comedies were played, and the development of inversion
into  subversion  plainly  belongs  to  contemporary  interpretations  of  this  ancient  work.
Furthermore, it has long been noticed that customarily and temporarily turning the world upside
down can reinforce  traditional  order  instead  of  subverting  it,  as  was  generally  the  case  for
slavery in antiquity: allowing slaves to play master for a short time during a festival hardly ever
challenged the institution of slavery, for example.
17. Hence some thinkers, like Virginia Held, have claimed that feminist ethics do a better job at
taking these aspects into account than dominant moral theories: “Instead of an individual man
and his projects or attachments […], feminists tend to focus on relationships that contrast with
impersonal impartiality and that are at least partially constitutive of the individuals in them.”
(Virginia Held, “Feminist Moral Inquiry and the Feminist Future” in Held 1995, 158).
18. In  fact,  she  thinks  that  the  voice  is  there  in  boys,  has  always  been there  but  has  been
repressed early on by education and socializing.
19. Noddings has recently acknowledged that “'feminine' pointed to a mode of experience, not
an  essential  characteristic of  women,  and  I  wanted  to  make  clear  that  men also  share  this
experience. ” (Noddings 2003, preface 2nd ed. xvi) 
20. See Marilyn Friedman, “Beyond Caring: the De-Moralization of Gender” in Held 1995, for a
critique of Gilligan’s position as too culturally situated. Friedman usefully reviews the scientific
evidence for and against the 'different voice hypothesis'.
21. She is straightforward concerning this point: “A just future is one without gender” (Okin
1989, 171).
22. See Commaille 1993, 126sq.
23. See Tronto 1993, esp. Part three. See also Layla Raïd “Care et politique chez Joan Tronto” and
Patricia Paperman “D’une voix discordante : désentimentaliser le care, démoraliser l’éthique” in
Molinier et al. 2009. 
24. On the dilemma of “differentialism ”and “universalism” as it relates to the parité debates, see
Scott 2005, esp. chapter 3.
25. For a qualified account of this position, see Brugère 2008.
26. Sara Ruddick, for instance, taking into account some of the criticisms mentioned earlier,
heartily bites the bullet and accepts the fact that “maternal peacefulness is a myth” (Ruddick
217), but she goes on to argue in favor of a revisionist view of the myth on the grounds that “the
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contemporary mythmaker can point to the usefulness of mothers and maternal thinking to peace
politics” (Ruddick 220).
ABSTRACTS
Feminist  arguments  in  favor  of  an  increased  participation  of  women  in  the  public  and  the
political spheres have sometimes resorted to the thesis of an alleged superior ability of women to
take  into  account  the  relational  dimension  of  human  life,  whether  acquired  in  the  private
experience of family life or considered to be an innate feminine disposition. In this context, the
myth of woman as a peacemaker has gained visibility and indeed has sometimes functioned as a
countermyth in feminist politics. This paper examines the occurrences and uses of this myth
from  Aristophanes  to  the  debates  surrounding  the  ethics  of  care,  through  the  suffragist
movement, as well as the critiques that have been addressed to it.
Certains  arguments  féministes  en  faveur  d’une  participation  accrue  des  femmes  à  la  sphère
politique ont mobilisé le thème de la capacité supposément supérieure des femmes à prendre en
compte la dimension relationnelle des rapports humains, acquise dans le cadre privé de la vie
familiale et parfois considérée comme une disposition innée. Dans ce cadre, le mythe de la femme
pacificatrice a gagné une certaine visibilité et a pu fonctionner comme un contre-mythe dans le
contexte  des  luttes  féministes  des  deux  derniers  siècles.  Cette  contribution  examine  les
traductions et les usages politiques de ce mythe depuis Aristophane jusqu’aux débats autour de la
parité et de l’éthique de la sollicitude, en passant par le mouvement suffragiste du début du siècle
dernier, ainsi que les critiques qui lui ont été adressées.
INDEX
Mots-clés: conflit, contre-mythe, éthique de la sollicitude, féminisme, paix, politique, publique/
privé
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